This proceeding is a Charter of Rights complaint arising from documented taser testing conducted by the Ottawa Police Service in conjunction with Joint Operations Command and the Ottawa Hospital. The claim alleges ongoing active surveillance, hospitalizations occurring in temporal correspondence with police access of non-criminal police reports over a twelve-year period, cross-border sharing of the subject's personal information without a warrant, and the alteration and destruction of medical records contrary to the National Defence Act.

Despite the absence of any evidentiary basis for dismissal and without the government defendants contesting any factual allegation, federally appointed Justice Alexandre Kaufman characterized the Plaintiff's claims as "fantastical" in endorsement and dismissed the action as frivolous and vexatious. The dismissal failed to satisfy the disjunctive evidentiary threshold required under Rule 2.1 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Ottawa Hospital was the only defendant to respond to the original Charter action in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. While the Hospital denied liability for the claimed damages, its Statement of Defence offered no factual basis for its position, relying instead on unsupported references to pre-existing conditions and multiple unsubstantiated diagnoses. These false and defamatory statements formed the basis of this subsequent action filed in Superior Court.

Justice London-Weinstein dismissed the action for lacking a cause of action and extended immunity to government lawyers with BLG LLP for statements contained in the pleadings. Immunity was granted on the reasoning that the statements were integrally connected to the issues in complaint solely by virtue of appearing in a responsive pleading. This order is considered void for exceeding judicial authority by immunizing conduct that violates provincial privacy legislation and potentially constitutes criminal defamation under Criminal Code sections 298, 300, and 301. The dissemination of personal medical information in court pleadings does not fall within the scope of permitted disclosure under applicable privacy law.

This matter was brought before the Ontario Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act on grounds of evident error of law and absence of evidence in Justice Kaufman's original dismissal. The Police respondent sought dismissal at the outset, challenged jurisdiction, and filed a Rule 2.1 request alleging duplicative proceedings. The Applicant presented a detailed plagiarism analysis demonstrating that Justice Kaufman had forced the Charter claims into a dismissible framework drawn wholesale from Gao v. WSIB without attribution, including duplicated citations and reasoning.

Justice Labrosse dismissed the application as an abuse of process for lacking jurisdiction while simultaneously exercising jurisdiction to effect that dismissal, the same self-contradicting error identified in the U.S. proceedings in Wilson v. USA (DC-CV-3826, 2023). Justice Labrosse further miscited authorities and conflated a previously unacknowledged application with the application then before the Court. By confirming the Supreme Court as responsible for appeals from Divisional Court, the Ontario Court of Appeal contradicted Justice Labrosse's order referring to the Court of Appeal as the only appropriate forum for review. Appeal deadlines expired during the nine-month delay in issuance of the underlying order, leaving the Plaintiff's constitutional claims unadjudicated from a void ruling.

The Petitioner sought judicial review of Justice London-Weinstein's dismissal under the Judicial Review Procedure Act. The Application requested relief to quash the void endorsement, restore the action to Superior Court, proceed to summary judgment if necessary, and award costs and interest on the originally claimed damages. Justice Labrosse again dismissed the review request under Rule 2.1, characterizing the Petitioner as abusive of process on the sole basis of lacking jurisdiction while exercising jurisdiction to dismiss.

Without evidentiary basis, Justice Labrosse characterized the Petitioner's claim for legal costs and interest as exceeding the $50,000 limit under section 19 of the Courts of Justice Act. The Petitioner's documented allegations of judicial plagiarism were dismissed in endorsement as simply copying the Rule 2.1 framework, despite evidence establishing that the plagiarism encompassed entire paragraphs of the defendant's factum adopted wholesale without attribution, including duplicated citations and reasoning. Justice Labrosse further declined jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act without addressing the JRPA jurisdiction explicitly stated in the Application, notwithstanding that the Courts of Justice Act expressly permits proceedings to be brought under other statutes, including the JRPA. Justice London-Weinstein's decision was considered void and unreviewable on appeal, leaving Divisional Court as the only appropriate forum for review.

This action was filed in response to false and defamatory accusations made by counsel employed by Gowlings WLG in reply submissions to the Plaintiff's response to the Police respondent's Rule 2.1 request for dismissal in the original action. Accusations by counsel for the Police included personally attacking a judicial officer while referencing non-existent rhetorical questions attributed to the Plaintiff, and characterizing the Plaintiff as vexatious without any evidentiary foundation. These accusations remain unanswered on the facts.

In Reasons for Decision (CAD7.pdf), Justice Roger dismissed the action as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 on a determination of privilege, extending that privilege to the conduct of the Police Defendants at the pleadings stage. A determination of privilege is not ordinarily subject to frivolous and vexatious procedures under Rule 2.1, which is reserved for claims that are facially devoid of merit, not claims subject to substantive legal defences requiring analysis on the merits. A reconsideration request was subsequently denied (CAD8.pdf). The matter is under review pending appeal.

Accepted for filing as SCC No. 42354, this petition arises from the Divisional Court's dismissal in DC-25-2976 and advances eight grounds. Ground 1 alleges that Justice Kaufman's endorsement contains thirty to forty percent plagiarized content from Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497, including transcribed errors and misapplication of the disjunctive Rule 2.1 test, constituting reviewable error under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter. Ground 2 establishes that the Respondents adduced no evidence to refute the Petitioner's documentary record, such that Rule 2.1 dismissal imposed an improper reverse burden rendering s. 24(1) ineffective contrary to Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, 2003 SCC 62. Ground 3 challenges Justice Labrosse's endorsement as void on its face: it simultaneously asserts no jurisdiction and exercises jurisdiction to dismiss, where the proper course was declination or transfer. Ground 4 identifies procedural fairness violations including the absence of mandatory Rule 2.1B notice, dismissal for abuse of process without hearing, and Justice Labrosse's sua sponte reliance on pro-Respondent authorities creating an appearance of bias contrary to R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 SCR 484.

Ground 5 establishes that Justice Labrosse conflated two distinct applications — an unacknowledged December 2024 mandamus application and the January 2025 JRPA certiorari application — deploying the court's own processing failure against the Petitioner. Ground 6 affirms Divisional Court jurisdiction under s. 19(1)–(2) of the Courts of Justice Act and the JRPA, noting the Court of Appeal's December 13, 2025, confirmation that SCC is the proper appeals forum directly contradicts Justice Labrosse's misdirection. Ground 7 advances that a Superior Court judge performing a Rule 2.1 screening function acts in a reviewable capacity, and that a contrary holding would create an unreviewable mechanism permanently foreclosing Charter litigation without merits consideration. Ground 8 invokes Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, requiring this Court's intervention under ss. 7, 15, and 24(1) to prevent Rule 2.1 from permanently immunizing government Respondents from Charter accountability.

A complaint was filed with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario after The Ottawa Hospital inserted invented diagnoses into its Statement of Defence in the original Charter proceedings, without clinical foundation or lawful basis for disclosure under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (PHIPA). IPC analyst Cayda Rubin declined to apply the relevant PHIPA disclosure provisions, characterizing the Hospital's conduct as outside the Commissioner's jurisdiction rather than engaging with the applicable statutory framework. The decision letter confirmed denial without addressing the substantive arguments raised in the Complainant's response to the preliminary view. Reconsideration was denied without reasons. The Complaint was denied review and the matter remains unresolved.

Following the Information and Privacy Commissioner's denial of reconsideration without reasons, the Petitioner commenced a Petition for Judicial Review before the Ontario Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act. The Petition seeks an order of certiorari to quash the IPC's decision declining to investigate The Ottawa Hospital's disclosure of personal health information in its Statement of Defence. The Petition further seeks declaratory relief to resolve the unsettled question of what constitutes "disclosure" of Personal Health Information (PHI) within the meaning of the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (PHIPA), specifically whether the insertion of invented clinical diagnoses into court pleadings by a health information custodian falls within the scope of permitted disclosure under that statute. The matter is currently pending before the Court.